To what extent did perestroika and glasnost succeed in reforming the political and economic systems of the USSR?

This essay received 39/45 which is a low level 5. To have received more marks I would have needed to sustain my overall argument and integrate the judgements made at the end earlier on in the essay.

To what extent did perestroika and glasnost succeed in reforming the political and economic systems of the USSR?

                In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev came to power to lead a Soviet Union approaching collapse. He proposed two different strands of reform, the first perestroika, meaning restructuring, and to accompany this, glasnost, meaning openness. Through perestroika, Gorbachev hoped to reform the structures of both the bureaucratic, command and stagnating economic system, and the undemocratic, conservative political system of the USSR, while glasnost was intended to encourage a greater openness across the political and social spectrum. However, it is debatable as to whether these political and economic systems were reformed to the extent they possibly could have been, or whether this extent had been compromised by Gorbachev’s inconsistent and incoherent reform. Progress was limited due to the contradictory nature of perestroika, as well as Glasnost being undermined by the scepticism of media freedoms. Therefore, perestroika and glasnost had little success in reforming the systems of the USSR.

                Gorbachev introduced economic perestroika as the introduction of market forces within the confines of the command economy that already existed, demonstrating that Gorbachev never intended to remove the existing command system, but rather streamline it to address the economic crisis that had resulted from the “Era of Stagnation” under Brezhnev. This already indicates that the extent of economic reform perestroika was expected to achieve was to be limited to continuing Stalinist central planning. In perestroika’s first phase of acceleration, the economic system was operating within a traditional framework because rather than use radical change to assist the economy, Gorbachev believed in “accelerated growth” achieved via tinkering. The 12^th Five Year Plan was set with considerably higher targets, continuing the Stalinist system of quantity being emphasised over quality, and as a result the economy was denied breathing space to rejuvenate. This rejuvenation was hoped to be achieved with the introduction of new production methods that would mean targets were met, but the opposite occurred. Instead, workers would revert back to lying about targets instead of trying to meet them, or simply refuse to overtly comply because they were expected to work harder for the same pay. The deficiencies of low productivity, corruption and bureaucracy remained because radical change wasn’t being attempted, and by this time the Stalinist system could was no longer applicable to the economic crisis facing the USSR. Despite the target of doubling national income by 2000, by April 1987 this had declined. Therefore in its early stages, perestroika neither achieved, nor aimed to achieve radical reform of the obsolete command economy, but rather stick to the traditional framework, but accelerate it.

                Reform was only attempted during acceleration through new innovations, including the Law on Individual Labour Activity of November 1986, which allowed some private enterprise, particularly in service sectors. Private enterprise had always been antagonised and controlled in the Soviet system, therefore to have produced reform that sought to encourage it may lead to the conclusion of Laver, that Gorbachev provided “a style of leadership not seen before in the USSR”. However, this was limited to the service sectors, not to mention the actuality proved otherwise, as enterprise was stifled with the long-existing “bureaucratic obstructionism” of conservative ministries, and while on paper, the law hoped to end the stigma surrounding private enterprise, the reality was that profit motive was still deemed as “anti-social”, or rather anti-socialist, and was “unearned income”. Subsequently, the economy continued to decline because no restructuring had occurred, consequently the economy was not reinvigorated, and Gorbachev’s credibility as a reformer dwindled, making it even harder for him to bring about radical reform in the next phase of perestroika. Therefore even if workers had wanted to innovate to achieve the targets set in the 12^th Five Year Plan, as opposed to lying about production figures, they would have been prevented by bureaucrats whose only concern was to meet their own targets via their dependence on outdated methods. Reform could not be sustained without greater restructuring, including decentralisation. By the time acceleration was dropped in 1988, attempt at economic reform had failed.

                After acceleration, phase two perestroika followed which was titled “Radical Reform from Above”, which at first suggests that Gorbachev intended to reform the economy to a greater extent after him and Party reformers realised tinkering simply wasn’t enough. The reforms attempted during this phase intended to give enterprise managers more accountability. The Law on State Enterprises in January 1988 meant managers would be elected by workers, and had more responsibility in finances and decision-making. But in actuality, the ministries still had final control, maintaining the centrally-planned economic model. This was the same case in the Law on Cooperatives in May 1988, which legalised private enterprise, suggesting that unlike with the Law on Individual Labour Activity during acceleration, Gorbachev now had more conviction to bring about successful reform that went beyond tinkering. However, because he would not remove the central planning system, enterprises outside of that were starved of resources and forced to barter with other enterprises, making them slow to develop. This became another example of what Laver calls Gorbachev’s “hotchpotch of initiatives”. The presence of central planning, despite causing reform to fail, and reducing national income to -4% by 1990, would not be removed by Gorbachev, and this is explicitly emphasised in his rejection of the Shatalin Plan, which proposed to move the economy to a market-based system within 500 days. It was rejected for its proposed decentralisation of economic powers to the Republics. Therefore, even as the economy was verging on collapse, the traditional framework of central-planning continued, showing a lack of reform from economic perestroika. As Popolov notes, perestroika “was done with slogans, and not a programme of reform”, it lacked substance and the actual conviction to bring about effective reform, rather tried to satisfy both political sides of the spectrum, leading it to become nothing more than “slogans” that failed to materialise into economic success.

                The fact that “bureaucratic obstructionism” was what caused economic reform to fail already suggests that his political perestroika also failed to reform the political system of the USSR. He hoped to democratise the USSR by introducing the publicly-elected Congress of People’s Deputies, who would then elect members of the Supreme Soviet. This “two-tier” structure was then adopted at all-Union level. It attempted to transform the political landscape from a One-Party System to a democratised state, and while the introduction of a publicly-elected body was progress, in reality this progress was very limited. 750 out of 2500 seats were reserved for public organisations, 100 of these seats being reserved for the Party, already showing that the extent of democracy, thereby the extent of reform, was limited. Furthermore, when the actual elections took place in March 1989, almost 90% of the elected deputies were Party members, due to elections being rigged, showing how democratisation failed to materialise as corruption and bureaucracy continued at a local level that Gorbachev failed to effectively combat. This failure to combat bureaucracy and corruption, as well as continuing the control of the conservative ministers in the Party demonstrates how while on the surface it appeared both economic and political systems were being reshaped, this only masked the continuation of Stalinist deficiencies that was causing stagnation, which were all dependent on the centralisation to the Party that existed economically, although this was reduced to a greater extent politically.

               

                The formation of opposition parties may indicate that the political system had been successfully reformed, including the Bloc of Democratic Russia which called for the removal of the Communist Party and free elections. Furthermore, power for the Party was no longer guaranteed, and such organisations did defeat some Party candidates for Congress, showing how the power of the Party had been reduced. But this is undermined when considering that the Party still had control of the KGB and the military, emphasising a lack of decline in their control. Therefore, while there was certainly more reform being made on a political level as opposed to economic through perestroika, there was not total reform as the limits to democratisation were made clear by the continued prominence of the Party. And because the bureaucrats of the Party maintained their control, but at the same time feared it being taken away from them, this made them determined to also maintain economic control as they continued to obstruct attempts of economic reform, leading to its failure.

               

                Alongside perestroika, Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost was introduced in 1986, but it must immediately be acknowledged that glasnost never intended to advocate complete freedom, especially in the media, already limiting the extent to which it could have reformed the political system. Rather, Gorbachev wanted greater openness to strengthen perestroika. When media freedom was allowed, presided over by Yakolev, Gorbachev actually thought there was too much, but reform even then was limited because publishers monitored output. Furthermore, Glasnost got off to a bad start with the Chernobyl disaster, Gorbachev only spoke publicly about it 2 weeks after the disaster occurred, and it received limited press coverage within the USSR, with facts surrounding the event being misconstrued. This shows a continuation of political control over the media, therefore the extent of reform glasnost achieved has to be viewed as limited. However, as Laver notes, Glasnost proved to be “a double-edged sword”; it must also be acknowledged that because of glasnost, topics that were previously viewed as taboo could be discussed in public, including suicide and abortion, and texts that were banned for their criticism of the system like Doctor Zhivago were published in the USSR for the first time. However, there remained the political desire among conservatives to control society, as there was now less respect for the Party and public discontent once perestroika was failing to materialise economic benefit, and this combined with the decline of political power via attempted democratisation meant conservatives called for the 1990 Law on Press Freedom, making it illegal to abuse freedom of speech by spreading information that didn’t correspond to reality, and thus undermining the reform glasnost had achieved prior.

                Therefore, while glasnost and political perestroika meant openness and democratisation were taking place in the political system of the USSR, their impact was limited because of the continued desire for control of conservative bureaucrats, who also stifled reform on an economic scale. But the fault for the lack of reform does not simple lie with external factors, perestroika in itself was an incoherent and inconsistent policy calling for a “halfway house” combining two conflicting systems of central planning and market forces. So long as central planning existed, reform could not truly materialise to the extent it needed to. 

To what extent did opposition to Gorbachev from hard-line Communists inside the USSR cause economic and political instability in the years 1985-1991?

This essay received 37/45, AKA a high level 4. To have reached level 5 I would have needed to include more synoptic links between factors, which I have now included. I probably also need to include another point as well, but to be fair this question is tough.

To what extent did opposition to Gorbachev from hard-line Communists inside the USSR cause economic and political instability in the years 1985-1991?

                Following the brief leaderships of Andropov and Chernenko, Gorbachev inherited the role of leader of the USSR, which was stagnating towards economic and political collapse. In an attempt to save the dying Union, he attempted reform in the form of his policies Perestroika, meaning restructuring in an economic and political sense, alongside glasnost, meaning openness. While this was supported by previous dissidents and some radicals, his policies were strongly opposed by the hard-line Communists. While this was a cause for the economic and political instability, it was neither the sole nor fundamental cause of instability. Both Gorbachev and the rise of Yeltsin must also be considered, as well as the fact that instability had been building up for years prior to Gorbachev’s premiership. Therefore, hard-line opposition wasn’t the ultimate cause of instability, rather it was an accumulation of factors.

                Hard-line opposition derived from a long tradition of the bureaucratic Party machine of resisting change, even when it was needed. This was not an immediate necessity in the Brezhnev years, thereby allowing his “Era of Conservatism” to be sustained, but when Gorbachev proposed new reform to save an ailing economy, conservatives like Ligachev that remained in the Party were ideologically committed to tried and trusted hard-line policies that had worked in a different economic landscape, leading them to conclude that they shouldn’t be changed. As Gorbachev tried to accelerate the economy via perestroika from 1985 to 1986-7, it failed. This was because the members of the Party elite, who dominated the ministries and planning agencies responsible for managing the economy, either didn’t overtly comply with his policy, or lied about production levels, causing inefficiency from bureaucracy. The results were disastrous. Despite ambitious targets to double national income by the year 2000, by April 1987, it had declined, and later in 1989, the Soviet budget deficit had increased from 3% in national income in 1985 to 14%. Existing economic instability continued, and early failure removed Gorbachev’s credibility as a reformer, making it even harder for him to bring about urgent reform shortly before collapse, creating further economic instability. Therefore in its early phase, perestroika failed to correct economic instability because of the bureaucratic obstructionism of hard-line communists, which had a long-term impact as the failure this opposition caused would undermine later phases of perestroika to correct economic instability, thus causing further suspicion and opposition.

                However, the fault for economic instability does not just lie with the conservative opposition. To an extent, the fault lies with Gorbachev himself, who had a limited understanding of economic policy, as well as its inconsistency. This was highlighted in his Law on State Enterprises as part of acceleration, which despite attempting to give enterprise managers more responsibility and accountability to make them self-managed entities, such enterprises were still subject to the State control of pricing and output policy. Despite the rhetoric of enterprise autonomy, this proved to be what would become known as one of Gorbachev’s many “slogans”; policies without substance. It failed to restructure the economy as promised, and because the extent of autonomy for enterprises remained ambiguous in his policy, this allowed the hard-line ministers to continue to assert their own control, continuing stagnation. Volkogonov referred to Gorbachev as “the last Leninist” because he didn’t show a long-standing commitment to reform, and even once the economy had hit crisis point in 1991, and the Shatalin Plan, which proposed to transform the economy to market-based within 500 days, was proposed to save the economy, Gorbachev rejected it for a compromise package that maintained the Soviet ways of economic management. His policy created space for the bureaucracy of hard-line Communist ministers to seethe through economic policy, and drag the economy down. It also frustrated the more radical Communists of the Party, and as Merridale notes, “the Party was not as conservative as depicted”, limiting the extent to which hard-line opposition played a role. Rather, Gorbachev’s inconsistent reform caused economic and political instability, because it provoked those who sought reform to support Gorbachev’s political rival, Boris Yeltsin.

                Yeltsin was the personal enemy of Gorbachev, but as opposed to coming from the hard-line of the Party, he was a radical. He became the first democratically-elected President of Russia, winning 57% of the popular vote, creating a system of dual power in Russia between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But it was in August 1991 that Yeltsin’s power eclipsed Gorbachev’s when a group of hard-line Communists sought to oust Gorbachev in a coup. This was after Gorbachev had drafted a Union Treaty that would create a voluntary Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. The conservatives feared they would lose important power bases as Republics gained their own sovereignty and could create their own laws that override USSR ones. One could argue that the hard-line Communists mounted a coup for they feared political instability in the USSR as Republics gained more autonomy, but in doing so they created further instability as Yeltsin opposed them, declaring the plotters to be traitors, and surmounting enough public support to succeed in ending the coup less than three days after it was launched. Gorbachev’s failure to give sufficient credit to Yeltsin for stopping the coup allowed Yeltsin to eclipse Gorbachev, and so on 23^rd August 1991 Yeltsin suspended the operations of the Communist Party in Russia, before the Supreme Soviet enacted this at an all-Union level. This created political instability, in that it fuelled nationalism within Republics once Communist leaders were no longer recognised in Moscow, and so their only way of surviving a political vacuum was to align themselves with nationalist movements in their host Republics. Some responsibility does rest on Yeltsin for this, because he sought more independence for Russia, but this was only possible because he was able to elevate his platform from the Coup, which was a form of opposition from hard-line Communists.

                However, the nationalities issue as a source of political instability was, as historian Laver notes, “a time-bomb waiting to explode”, and was simply not only a product of Yeltsin’s Russian politics. Republics like the Baltic States and the Ukraine had been seeking independence long before 1985, dating back even to the Stalin years. The Baltic States had been annexed by the USSR in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, and since then those who had lived the days of independence remembered them favourably. But this nationalism stayed under the surface from leader to leader, until in the atmosphere of Glasnost they were openly able to question the legality of the annexation, promoting public movements for independence, which Gorbachev must have acknowledged as a threat to have sent tanks in. But his hard-line politics worked counter-productively, only sparking more nationalist tension. Therefore, in terms of political instability in relation to the Baltic States, while the initial process of Gorbachev’s reform was like opening a can of worms of nationalist discontent that had been simmering for decades, his hard-line response only accelerated an already destabilising situation. Because of his radical political and economic reforms, it cannot be claimed that Gorbachev was a hard-line Communist himself, but rather the early opposition to perestroika from hard-line Communists and its subsequent failure caused him to adopt hard-line policies himself in order to appease both sides of the spectrum. But yet, in the case of nationalities, while the rise of Yeltsin that may be attributed to the opposition of hard-line communists, as well as Gorbachev’s poor decisions that were motivated by a desire to appease hard-line opposition may be viewed as the “final straw” of the nationalities, this is underpinned by the build-up of independence movements in the Republics that had existed since Stalin, and that political instability between Russia and her Republics was long-term. Nothing short-term rectified, nor could rectify this. As historian Ward highlights, “one man could not prevent this”.

                Therefore, while the opposition of hard-line Communists certainly had a part to play in accelerating political and economic instability, the fact was this was “accelerating”, and not “creating” instability. By the time of Gorbachev’s reform, it was too little, too late, and even if his economic policy had had more substance and consistency, it would have done little to save a dying economy that he had inherited from Brezhnev. The short-term economic failure and the rise of Yeltsin were caused by hard-line opposition, but this is overshadowed by the long-term instability that already existed within the USSR.

“Attempts to modernise the Soviet economy between 1945 and the death of Brezhnev in 1982 were unsuccessful.”

Just to note, I absolutely despised this question and am glad it came up last year so it doesn't come up this year. it received a top level 4, to have reached level 5 I need to make my argument more sustained and make sure to build on it as I move on to each paragraph.

“Attempts to modernise the Soviet economy between 1945 and the death of Brezhnev in 1982 were unsuccessful.” Assess the validity of this view.

                Between 1945 to 1982, three leaders held the reins of the Soviet economy: Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. While it can be said for all three that attempts were made to modernise Soviet industry, the same cannot be said for the perennial problems of the economy, namely agriculture and consumer industries. As Laver notes, agriculture was the “always neglected step-sister of industry”, and this continued from Stalin’s collectivisation drives in 1930s all the way to Brezhnev’s death in 1982. Industry had mixed results among all leaders as success in modernisation varied, while Stalin led the USSR to recovery after the Great Patriotic War, during Khrushchev’s policy of destalinisation, and Brezhnev’s “era of stagnation”. While to an extent, the Soviet economy made progress, the traditional weaknesses of the Stalinist economic model lingered up until Brezhnev’s death in 1982.

                Following Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War, the USSR economy embarked on a period of recovery and reconstruction, which was achieved to an extent by modernisation within heavy industry. Kenez cites the speed of this recovery to have been “impressive”. Under the 4^th Five Year Plan starting in 1946 to 1950, 90% of investment was directed towards capital goods, resulting in a 75% increase in industrial production. Key heavy industries like coal met or exceeded their targets, with the coal target of 149 million tonnes being exceeded to produce 261. While such figures may be refuted as exaggerated Soviet statistics, there still remains an indisputable trend of progression that demonstrates impressive recovery and vast economic improvement in terms of heavy industry, showing that after the war, the Soviet economy in order to regain the 2/3 of Soviet property that had been destroyed during the war, as well as to generate the 7 years’ worth of pre-war income that had been lost. This was only assisted by not only seeking to modernise within the USSR, but by using assets stripped from the new territory gained from the war, including factories from East Germany used to produce Moskovitch cars. Stalin also sought to modernise defence even further following the war as the Cold War loomed over East-West tensions. The first Soviet atom bomb test took place in 1949, followed by the Soviet hydrogen bomb test in 1953. Therefore, in the industries that had been prioritised before and during the war, great gains were continuing to be made, showing that there was successful modernisation taking place.

                However, when considering the production methods used during this period of recovery, it becomes clear that attempts to modernise were limited. Despite losing 1/5 of its pre-war population in mass casualties, the economy remained obsolete and labour-intensive, and while mechanised assets may have been stripped from gained territory, domestic mechanisation was limited. In the immediate post-war period, the workforce increased from 66 million to 76 million, many of whom were women, and unskilled and inexperienced having to replace the skilled workers who had died fighting. This meant the traditional weakness of low productivity was still in place, and there was little attempt to modernise this aspect by mechanising production methods. Rather through the “blunt instrument” of high targets, as Laver refers to them, within the command economy, production increased and produced capital that could then be invested into modernisation projects. But this increase in industrial production therefore masks such deficiencies in the economy that were not combatted in the post-war period, making the extent of modernisation in industry limited, although the rate of recovery means it cannot be claimed that there was no modernisation at all.

                While modernisation may have been taking place in industry, the same cannot be said for agriculture. There was a continuation of the Stalinist treatment of agriculture from the 1930s when it was treated merely as a source of revenue, and there was no attempt to modernise agriculture in order to increase grain production. Rather, grain procurement increased to 60-70% of the harvest, but actual harvest figures failed to reach pre-war levels until much later. It was only in 1952 that the harvest figure totalled that of 1913, which was still low. Although it cannot be disputed that there was recovery after the war as grain harvests returned to pre-war levels, this recovery was achieved through “insufficient investment” and “ill-judged intentions” as historian Nove notes, thereby it was not modernised, and recovery was still limited. So long as there was enough grain to export and feed the workforce in order to sustain industrial recovery, Stalin had no intention of modernising an economic sector he deemed to be nothing more than revenue.

                Following Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev enacted his policy of destalinisation which historian Thatcher cites as, “the removal of Stalinist excesses”, thereby already establishing that Khrushchev had no intention of completely removing Stalinism, the economic aspects of which were central-planning and neglect of agriculture and consumer industries, but rather to streamline the existing system to adapt to the shifting economic landscape. One of his main policies under destalinisation was his notorious Virgin Lands Scheme, when in the summer of 1954, over 250,000 volunteers, mainly from the Komsomol, were sent to regions in Kazakhstan and western Siberia to cultivate the virgin soil for grain production. In its nature, the Virgin Lands Scheme can be viewed as an attempt at modernisation in focusing on improving grain production as opposed to grain procurement. It achieved initial success, with grain production increasing by 50% and totalling 50% of the total grain harvest of the USSR, showing an extent of modernisation in this aspect of the economy, but this success was not sustained. In 1963, despite the target for grain production being 180 million tonnes, only 107 was harvested. By the end of the scheme, 13,000 m² of topsoil had been eroded due to over-cultivating the land, and when Khrushchev instructed the farmers to plant maize, only 1/6 could be harvested due to the rest having rotted. The Virgin Lands Scheme became one of Khrushchev’s “hare-brained schemes” that were used for his dismissal, and its failure comes down to the traditional weaknesses of the Soviet economy, poor planning and obsolescence, as there was a lack of fertilisers, machinery and expertise being directed towards the scheme, replaced by an over-reliance on labour. While Khrushchev made more attempt to modernise agriculture than Stalin had by focusing on production rather than procurement, like Stalin, he failed to plan coherently and give it the length of consideration it needed.

                As Nove notes, “Economically speaking, the Brezhnev period has to be seen as a disaster”, already giving the inclination that there was limited modernisation during the Brezhnev regime.

Historiography cites the Brezhnev period as an “Era of Conservatism”, conservatism meaning that it stuck to tradition and suspected reform, once again embedding the idea that there was little to no modernisation being attempted. When it was attempted, mainly in space and defence technology as shown by the 15-year scientific research programme the regime approved of, these were the same priorities as under Stalin and Khrushchev, rather than adjusting to new conditions such as the modernisation of civilian sectors. Rather, such sectors were treated with suspicion, including typewriters, personal computers and photocopiers. The fear of losing control over distribution of information stifled modernisation of consumer industries. While Laver does cite there to have been “no evidence of widespread dissatisfaction” as living standards generally improved, with a 50% increase in consumption of meat, vegetables and fish, this was not because of attempts to modernise the economy. This was the growth of a vast “2^nd economy”, estimated to have amounted to 100 billion roubles annually, filling in the gaps of consumer industries the regime failed to have accounted for. Therefore, even if living standards had generally improved compared to Khrushchev and Stalin, this was not due to modernisation, but because the black market supported the economy where it fell short.

                But even within prioritised economic sectors like heavy industry there was also limited modernisation. Reform was suspected and obstructed by the bureaucrats who maintained their positions through Brezhnev’s Stability of Cadres, causing Brezhnev to reverse Khrushchev’s policy of decentralisation and his determination to make central-planning work. This was exemplified by the Kosygin Reforms, which were introduced in 1965 to encourage managers to be more accountable for prices, costs and encouraged profit-motive, so that heavy industries like coal would no longer be operating at a loss. These reforms were unsuccessful due to a variety of factors, namely that there were clashes between managers eager to comply with these reforms and the conservative bureaucrats in charge of ensuring targets were met, or because there were managers unenthusiastic about innovation due to lack of incentives and the fear of not meeting centrally-determined targets. In either case, these issues arose from the dead weight of the command economy that remained, leading to the deficiencies of low productivity from the Stalin era. The reforms were abandoned by 1970 as the economy continued to stagnate, with the Russian economist Khanin estimating economic growth between 1975-80 to have only been 1%. When reform was attempted, it was killed off at an early stage before it could materialise, or modernisation was hardly attempted at all. Therefore, unlike with Stalin and Khrushchev, in terms of heavy industry, unsuccessful modernisation was not caused by deficiencies in the reform being attempted, it was because this reform was hardly being attempted in the first place.

                Therefore, while agriculture continued to be a sector in which hardly any modernisation was attempted, or was attempted and wholly didn’t succeed, heavy industry was a mixed bag. While under Stalin heavy industry saw impressive recovery because of successful modernisation, this success was not continued to the same extent by Khrushchev or Brezhnev as the economy slipped into stagnation, and  any attempts at modernisation following Stalin was undermined by his centrally-commanded economy that did not adapt to the shifting modern and innovative economic landscape. 

Industry Synopticity

Synoptic Question: Industry

Stalin

Before/During the War

Stalinist system of central command economy with Gosplan as economic planning agency & use of FYPs entrenched in system. Meant economy could be unilaterally directed to war effort.

3^rd FYP meant armament production trebled. 100,000 tanks produced in the war. 1 million artillery shells being built every month.

BUT – by end of 1942 industrial production only 68% of pre-war production

Lend-Lease Scheme 1942

Equalled 1/5 Soviet resources, 53% of explosives, 1000 trains vs 52 produced by USSR, $111 billion in aid

After War

Command economy continued after war to focus on industrial recovery

2/3 Soviet property destroyed, loss of 7 years’ worth of pre-war income

90% investment went into capital goods, industrial production increased by 75%

1940 quotas exceeded in 1950, apart from in agriculture

In the 4^th FYP, all targets were met apart from agriculture

Oil production doubled between 1945-50, from 19 million tonnes to 41

The BAM railway and Dnepropatrovsk dam were prestige projects

Economic growth from 1950-56 was 10%

Khrushchev

Destalinisation – trying to remove excesses of command economy

Set up 7YP (1959-1965)

40% investment went into previously neglected Eastern region

3 sectors failed to meet their targets, 2 sectors scrapped targets and only one met targets

Investment was put into new industries: nuclear, space and chemicals, diverting investment away from old sectors like coal and steel

There was still an emphasis on quantity over quality

Between 1959-63, economic growth had decreased to 5%

Decentralisation was introduced in 1957

105 regional ministries with economic councils (sonarkhozy) set up

Eventual remerged together, ministries coveted resources because of Stalinist fear of not meeting targets

Brezhnev

Utilising oil in Siberia, in 1983 357 million tonnes of oil were extracted, this totalled 60% of oil production

Industrial output in 1970-80 fell by 15%

In the 10^th FYP, no targets were met

Kosygin Reforms were attempted in 1965, trying to make managers more accountable by introducing costs, prices and profit motive, failed from bureaucratic obstructionism, abandoned by 1970

By 1982, industrial growth had stopped

25% of investment was devoted to the military, increasing by 5% each year, USSR outspent USA on defence

Black Market grew – 2^nd economy = 20% GNP, 40% total personal income and 100 billion roubles annually

15 year scientific programme – but not for civilian sectors

Andropov

Set out an industrial experiment in December 1984, trying to make enterprise managers more accountable, decreasing power of ministries, and using output as success indicator

Not successful due to lack of decentralisation

Anti-Corruption drive – discipline and efficiency

Chernenko

Reversed the anti-corruption drive

Gorbachev in charge of economic planning while he was ill

Gorbachev

Perestroika called (Katastroika)

Acceleration – thought accelerated growth would solve problem (tinkering), gave economy no breathing space

12 FYP set higher targets, workers complained about having to meet higher targets

Law on Joint Enterprise

Allowed foreign industry, but didn’t work because they functioned on profit-motive while Soviet enterprises didin’t

Trade deficit with the West widened

Law on State Enterprise Jan 1988 – workers could elect managers, trying to make managers more accountable for finances and decision-making

Ministries still had final control – bureaucratic obstructionism

Law on Cooperatives May 1988

Legalised 2^nd economy as enterprises had to barter with others because they were starved of resources outside of centrally-planned economy

By 1989, trade deficit was 10% of GNP

By 1991 inflation was rising 2-3% each week

Shatalin Plan proposed – convert to market-based economy in 500 days, but rejected by Gorbachev and Ryzhkov

Replaced by 4 Stage Compromise Package approved by Supreme Soviet in Oct 1991

By January 1991, private property ownership was legalised, effectively ending communism

And that’s all folks!

Dissidence Synoptic Question

Synoptic Question: Dissidence

Stalin

During the war, 1 million Soviets defected to fight with the Germans, as well as the Germans being welcomed in Ukraine as liberators

In 1944, 400,000 Volga Germans were deported after being labelled as traitors and “enemies of the State”. The same fate was met by the Crimean Tartars

After the war, under High Stalinism, any feared dissidence was crushed. His policy of Anti-Cosmopolitanism banned western influence, and any feared opposition like the Leningrad Party was purged (200 officials)

Khrushchev

Through the legal code introduced in December 1958, vague crimes like “enemy of the people” could no longer be reason for conviction.

Through the Khrushchev Thaw, there was a relaxation of restrictions over culture, i.e. Solzhenitsyn was published

However, this was limited to if such works served the purpose of destalinisation. Works like Doctor Zhivago were still banned, Pasternak was called “a weed on Soviet soil” and he couldn’t collect his Nobel Prize.

Dissident writers were still harassed and imprisoned by the KGB, although Khrushchev said there were no political periods during this time

5 million gulag prisoners were released, including thousands of political prisoners

There was an anti-religious campaign resurrected from the 1920s and30s. Between 1960-64, over ½ of churches were closed. Priests were imprisoned, or killed. Church-going was condemned.

Overall the Party still had authority over creative intellectuals

Brezhnev

Sinyavsky and Daniel 1966

First public show trial since Stalin

Punished with 5 and 7 years of hard labour for distributing “anti-Soviet propaganda”

Received Western press attention from New York Times and La Monde – trial behind closed doors

KGB unit set up in 1967 against ideological diversions

Czechoslovakia 1968

Dubcek proposed reforms under “Socialism with a human face”, specified not leaving Warsaw Pact

Warsaw Pact forces sent in, crushing Prague Spring and restoring order

Brezhnev Doctrine issued after saying Soviet forces could invade where Communism was being threatened

Red Square Protests followed in Moscow

Helsinki Groups

Helsinki Accords adopted by regime in 1975, promising to uphold fundamental freedoms and human rights

Helsinki groups set up to make sure regime was following this

These groups were harassed by the KGB, threatened with imprisonment, or even being put in psychiatric hospitals

By 1978, 20 members of the groups were imprisoned

By 1982, the groups had disbanded after 60 out of 80 of the members were tried or jailed

Jewish Emigration

Religious practice was dissidence by not devoting one’s self to socialism

Jewish community sought to emigrate, while there were refuseniks who demonstrated in Red Square

In the 1970s, many were allowed to emigrate (had to pay a tax), 250,000 emigrated in the 1970s. In 1979 alone, 51,000 emigrated. But emigration was soon restricted again in 1982.

They were used as pawns in the Cold War, emigration controls were relaxed when relations with the West were good, and tightened when they worsened

Andropov

There were strict limits on expression of opinions

The harassment of dissidents continued, and Jewish emigration was halted

Gorbachev

Under Glasnost, people were able to voice discontent and opinions more freely

Baltic States able to question legality of annexation

More religious tolerance

Hard to say what was dissidence because the regime’s policy was so incoherent
Hard-line Communists opposed Gorbachev's economic policies, and mounted the August 1991 coup against him

To be honest, I feel that if they ask a question on dissidence, it will be from Stalin to Brezhnev rather than to Gorbachev because there’s little to say for him.

Role and Position of the Communist Party Synoptic Question

The following is a plan for a synoptic question concerning the Role and Position of the Communist Party from Stalin to Gorbachev.

Stalin

1941-45 Great Patriotic War

The Party became less working-class by recruiting more white-collar workers.

75% of Party members joined the army

By 1945 – 2/3 had been recruited since 1941, and these recruits were typically younger and more educated

The army took more control, particularly because of Zhukov’s contributions in the war, so the Party became less involved in military and political issues, and more in economic planning and administration. Arguably, the Party had less of a position during the war, although 70% of those awarded with “Hero of the Soviet Union” were Party members

1945-53 High Stalinism

10% of the population were Party members, showing they still held a great position in society

People joined for two reasons:

1. Ideological commitment to Communism

2. Career advancement

Higher Party members had special privileges, like special shops with consumer goods unavailable to the public. But there was also the risk of Stalinist purges, as shown by the Leningrad Affair

Politicisation of Life remained, with censorship and propaganda

Stalin was seen as a figurehead of the Party and the USSR with his maintained cult of personality

Party met less with Stalin, but he still had to ratify the proposals they made without him

Khrushchev

Under Reform Communism, the population was to support the system through popular consent rather than force

Destalinisation criticised Stalin, thereby criticising the old Party, and thus damaged its reputation to an extent, but it remained stable

Arbitrary terror was removed, but criticism of the regime was still suppressed. For example, with the Anti-Party Group in 1957, who opposed the influence of the Party over the government, these opponents weren’t liquidated like under Stalin, but rather they were demoted to lower positions. He sacked Zhukov and demoted him out of fear of the military power.

Party members were now allowed to speak out against Khrushchev, allowing him to be dismissed

Khrushchev also wanted to stop “jobs for life”, making it necessary to have a certain number of newly-elected members at any time. At Presidium or Central Committee level, 1/3 were to be newly elected.

With his policy of decentralisation and bifurication, the Party had less control over economic planning as the Republics and regional ministries gained more

Brezhnev

His policies of Stability of Cadres and Nomenklatura meant that only 2% of the population (3-5 million) was represented in the list of nepotism

The Party grew older and more conservative – the CC average age increased to 63 years, while the average age of the Politburo increased by 10 years

There were also privileges and corruption in the Party, for example high-ranking members were given dachas, new medical facilities and shops

There were stricter admission rules and a lack of enthusiasm of joining the Party, leading to a decline in membership

Membership growth in 1965 was 7%, this declined and stayed at 2% by 1973

In the Brezhnev Constitutionof 1977, the Party was cemented as a the “leading force of Soviet society” and the “nucleus” of Soviet politics. The Party could therefore decide what the interests of society were.

Andropov

He wanted to inject the Party with new life. 1/5 of regional secretaries (including 7/20 in Kazakhstan, Brezhnev’s power base) and 1/3 of departmental heads in the CC were replaced.

Andropov started an Anti-Corruption drive

Chernenko

He presided over a Party Commission that said through peaceful competition, the USSR could move towards socialism, although unlike Khrushchev, he didn’t specify a time frame

Andropov’s Anti-Corruption drive was dropped, as Chernenko wanted to keep Party privileges

The Party took a hard-line against dissidents

Gorbachev

The law was made independent of the Party, making Party officials accountable under the law. As the Anti-Corruption drive restarted, officials were arrested

The Congress of People’s Deputies was set up as a publicly-elected law-making body

750/2500 seats were reserved for public organisations

100 seats were reserved for the Party, making democratisation limited, but also reducing the power of the Party

However, in the March 1989 elections, 90% of deputies were Party members because of rigged elections, the structure was not used in subsequent elections

Opposition parties were allowed to form to challenge the Communist Party, e.g. Bloc of Democratic Russia and the Democratic Party

The most influential of these organisations was the International Group of deputies, which was prepared to call the Party out

The two-tier structure was adopted at an all-Union level, meaning power wasn’t only lost in Russia, but in the Republics. Republican officials didn’t know who they were representing, and as Yeltsin disbanded the CPSU in Russia, they were forced to side with nationalist movements

Gorbachev wanted to maintain the leading role of the Party, which wasn’t possible with the clear separation of powers, creating an ideological paradox that was inconsistent and incoherent

The Party was no longer in charge of economic policy, the Politburo only dealt with internal Party affairs, but the Party still had control of the KGB and the military

In 1990, 14% of Party members had left (3 million), while many more threatened to leave or stopped their subscriptions. This was because of the loss of direction in the Party.