To what extent did perestroika and glasnost succeed in reforming the political and economic systems of the USSR?

This essay received 39/45 which is a low level 5. To have received more marks I would have needed to sustain my overall argument and integrate the judgements made at the end earlier on in the essay.

To what extent did perestroika and glasnost succeed in reforming the political and economic systems of the USSR?

                In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev came to power to lead a Soviet Union approaching collapse. He proposed two different strands of reform, the first perestroika, meaning restructuring, and to accompany this, glasnost, meaning openness. Through perestroika, Gorbachev hoped to reform the structures of both the bureaucratic, command and stagnating economic system, and the undemocratic, conservative political system of the USSR, while glasnost was intended to encourage a greater openness across the political and social spectrum. However, it is debatable as to whether these political and economic systems were reformed to the extent they possibly could have been, or whether this extent had been compromised by Gorbachev’s inconsistent and incoherent reform. Progress was limited due to the contradictory nature of perestroika, as well as Glasnost being undermined by the scepticism of media freedoms. Therefore, perestroika and glasnost had little success in reforming the systems of the USSR.

                Gorbachev introduced economic perestroika as the introduction of market forces within the confines of the command economy that already existed, demonstrating that Gorbachev never intended to remove the existing command system, but rather streamline it to address the economic crisis that had resulted from the “Era of Stagnation” under Brezhnev. This already indicates that the extent of economic reform perestroika was expected to achieve was to be limited to continuing Stalinist central planning. In perestroika’s first phase of acceleration, the economic system was operating within a traditional framework because rather than use radical change to assist the economy, Gorbachev believed in “accelerated growth” achieved via tinkering. The 12^th Five Year Plan was set with considerably higher targets, continuing the Stalinist system of quantity being emphasised over quality, and as a result the economy was denied breathing space to rejuvenate. This rejuvenation was hoped to be achieved with the introduction of new production methods that would mean targets were met, but the opposite occurred. Instead, workers would revert back to lying about targets instead of trying to meet them, or simply refuse to overtly comply because they were expected to work harder for the same pay. The deficiencies of low productivity, corruption and bureaucracy remained because radical change wasn’t being attempted, and by this time the Stalinist system could was no longer applicable to the economic crisis facing the USSR. Despite the target of doubling national income by 2000, by April 1987 this had declined. Therefore in its early stages, perestroika neither achieved, nor aimed to achieve radical reform of the obsolete command economy, but rather stick to the traditional framework, but accelerate it.

                Reform was only attempted during acceleration through new innovations, including the Law on Individual Labour Activity of November 1986, which allowed some private enterprise, particularly in service sectors. Private enterprise had always been antagonised and controlled in the Soviet system, therefore to have produced reform that sought to encourage it may lead to the conclusion of Laver, that Gorbachev provided “a style of leadership not seen before in the USSR”. However, this was limited to the service sectors, not to mention the actuality proved otherwise, as enterprise was stifled with the long-existing “bureaucratic obstructionism” of conservative ministries, and while on paper, the law hoped to end the stigma surrounding private enterprise, the reality was that profit motive was still deemed as “anti-social”, or rather anti-socialist, and was “unearned income”. Subsequently, the economy continued to decline because no restructuring had occurred, consequently the economy was not reinvigorated, and Gorbachev’s credibility as a reformer dwindled, making it even harder for him to bring about radical reform in the next phase of perestroika. Therefore even if workers had wanted to innovate to achieve the targets set in the 12^th Five Year Plan, as opposed to lying about production figures, they would have been prevented by bureaucrats whose only concern was to meet their own targets via their dependence on outdated methods. Reform could not be sustained without greater restructuring, including decentralisation. By the time acceleration was dropped in 1988, attempt at economic reform had failed.

                After acceleration, phase two perestroika followed which was titled “Radical Reform from Above”, which at first suggests that Gorbachev intended to reform the economy to a greater extent after him and Party reformers realised tinkering simply wasn’t enough. The reforms attempted during this phase intended to give enterprise managers more accountability. The Law on State Enterprises in January 1988 meant managers would be elected by workers, and had more responsibility in finances and decision-making. But in actuality, the ministries still had final control, maintaining the centrally-planned economic model. This was the same case in the Law on Cooperatives in May 1988, which legalised private enterprise, suggesting that unlike with the Law on Individual Labour Activity during acceleration, Gorbachev now had more conviction to bring about successful reform that went beyond tinkering. However, because he would not remove the central planning system, enterprises outside of that were starved of resources and forced to barter with other enterprises, making them slow to develop. This became another example of what Laver calls Gorbachev’s “hotchpotch of initiatives”. The presence of central planning, despite causing reform to fail, and reducing national income to -4% by 1990, would not be removed by Gorbachev, and this is explicitly emphasised in his rejection of the Shatalin Plan, which proposed to move the economy to a market-based system within 500 days. It was rejected for its proposed decentralisation of economic powers to the Republics. Therefore, even as the economy was verging on collapse, the traditional framework of central-planning continued, showing a lack of reform from economic perestroika. As Popolov notes, perestroika “was done with slogans, and not a programme of reform”, it lacked substance and the actual conviction to bring about effective reform, rather tried to satisfy both political sides of the spectrum, leading it to become nothing more than “slogans” that failed to materialise into economic success.

                The fact that “bureaucratic obstructionism” was what caused economic reform to fail already suggests that his political perestroika also failed to reform the political system of the USSR. He hoped to democratise the USSR by introducing the publicly-elected Congress of People’s Deputies, who would then elect members of the Supreme Soviet. This “two-tier” structure was then adopted at all-Union level. It attempted to transform the political landscape from a One-Party System to a democratised state, and while the introduction of a publicly-elected body was progress, in reality this progress was very limited. 750 out of 2500 seats were reserved for public organisations, 100 of these seats being reserved for the Party, already showing that the extent of democracy, thereby the extent of reform, was limited. Furthermore, when the actual elections took place in March 1989, almost 90% of the elected deputies were Party members, due to elections being rigged, showing how democratisation failed to materialise as corruption and bureaucracy continued at a local level that Gorbachev failed to effectively combat. This failure to combat bureaucracy and corruption, as well as continuing the control of the conservative ministers in the Party demonstrates how while on the surface it appeared both economic and political systems were being reshaped, this only masked the continuation of Stalinist deficiencies that was causing stagnation, which were all dependent on the centralisation to the Party that existed economically, although this was reduced to a greater extent politically.

               

                The formation of opposition parties may indicate that the political system had been successfully reformed, including the Bloc of Democratic Russia which called for the removal of the Communist Party and free elections. Furthermore, power for the Party was no longer guaranteed, and such organisations did defeat some Party candidates for Congress, showing how the power of the Party had been reduced. But this is undermined when considering that the Party still had control of the KGB and the military, emphasising a lack of decline in their control. Therefore, while there was certainly more reform being made on a political level as opposed to economic through perestroika, there was not total reform as the limits to democratisation were made clear by the continued prominence of the Party. And because the bureaucrats of the Party maintained their control, but at the same time feared it being taken away from them, this made them determined to also maintain economic control as they continued to obstruct attempts of economic reform, leading to its failure.

               

                Alongside perestroika, Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost was introduced in 1986, but it must immediately be acknowledged that glasnost never intended to advocate complete freedom, especially in the media, already limiting the extent to which it could have reformed the political system. Rather, Gorbachev wanted greater openness to strengthen perestroika. When media freedom was allowed, presided over by Yakolev, Gorbachev actually thought there was too much, but reform even then was limited because publishers monitored output. Furthermore, Glasnost got off to a bad start with the Chernobyl disaster, Gorbachev only spoke publicly about it 2 weeks after the disaster occurred, and it received limited press coverage within the USSR, with facts surrounding the event being misconstrued. This shows a continuation of political control over the media, therefore the extent of reform glasnost achieved has to be viewed as limited. However, as Laver notes, Glasnost proved to be “a double-edged sword”; it must also be acknowledged that because of glasnost, topics that were previously viewed as taboo could be discussed in public, including suicide and abortion, and texts that were banned for their criticism of the system like Doctor Zhivago were published in the USSR for the first time. However, there remained the political desire among conservatives to control society, as there was now less respect for the Party and public discontent once perestroika was failing to materialise economic benefit, and this combined with the decline of political power via attempted democratisation meant conservatives called for the 1990 Law on Press Freedom, making it illegal to abuse freedom of speech by spreading information that didn’t correspond to reality, and thus undermining the reform glasnost had achieved prior.

                Therefore, while glasnost and political perestroika meant openness and democratisation were taking place in the political system of the USSR, their impact was limited because of the continued desire for control of conservative bureaucrats, who also stifled reform on an economic scale. But the fault for the lack of reform does not simple lie with external factors, perestroika in itself was an incoherent and inconsistent policy calling for a “halfway house” combining two conflicting systems of central planning and market forces. So long as central planning existed, reform could not truly materialise to the extent it needed to.