“Attempts to modernise the Soviet economy between 1945 and the death of Brezhnev in 1982 were unsuccessful.”

Just to note, I absolutely despised this question and am glad it came up last year so it doesn't come up this year. it received a top level 4, to have reached level 5 I need to make my argument more sustained and make sure to build on it as I move on to each paragraph.

“Attempts to modernise the Soviet economy between 1945 and the death of Brezhnev in 1982 were unsuccessful.” Assess the validity of this view.

                Between 1945 to 1982, three leaders held the reins of the Soviet economy: Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. While it can be said for all three that attempts were made to modernise Soviet industry, the same cannot be said for the perennial problems of the economy, namely agriculture and consumer industries. As Laver notes, agriculture was the “always neglected step-sister of industry”, and this continued from Stalin’s collectivisation drives in 1930s all the way to Brezhnev’s death in 1982. Industry had mixed results among all leaders as success in modernisation varied, while Stalin led the USSR to recovery after the Great Patriotic War, during Khrushchev’s policy of destalinisation, and Brezhnev’s “era of stagnation”. While to an extent, the Soviet economy made progress, the traditional weaknesses of the Stalinist economic model lingered up until Brezhnev’s death in 1982.

                Following Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War, the USSR economy embarked on a period of recovery and reconstruction, which was achieved to an extent by modernisation within heavy industry. Kenez cites the speed of this recovery to have been “impressive”. Under the 4^th Five Year Plan starting in 1946 to 1950, 90% of investment was directed towards capital goods, resulting in a 75% increase in industrial production. Key heavy industries like coal met or exceeded their targets, with the coal target of 149 million tonnes being exceeded to produce 261. While such figures may be refuted as exaggerated Soviet statistics, there still remains an indisputable trend of progression that demonstrates impressive recovery and vast economic improvement in terms of heavy industry, showing that after the war, the Soviet economy in order to regain the 2/3 of Soviet property that had been destroyed during the war, as well as to generate the 7 years’ worth of pre-war income that had been lost. This was only assisted by not only seeking to modernise within the USSR, but by using assets stripped from the new territory gained from the war, including factories from East Germany used to produce Moskovitch cars. Stalin also sought to modernise defence even further following the war as the Cold War loomed over East-West tensions. The first Soviet atom bomb test took place in 1949, followed by the Soviet hydrogen bomb test in 1953. Therefore, in the industries that had been prioritised before and during the war, great gains were continuing to be made, showing that there was successful modernisation taking place.

                However, when considering the production methods used during this period of recovery, it becomes clear that attempts to modernise were limited. Despite losing 1/5 of its pre-war population in mass casualties, the economy remained obsolete and labour-intensive, and while mechanised assets may have been stripped from gained territory, domestic mechanisation was limited. In the immediate post-war period, the workforce increased from 66 million to 76 million, many of whom were women, and unskilled and inexperienced having to replace the skilled workers who had died fighting. This meant the traditional weakness of low productivity was still in place, and there was little attempt to modernise this aspect by mechanising production methods. Rather through the “blunt instrument” of high targets, as Laver refers to them, within the command economy, production increased and produced capital that could then be invested into modernisation projects. But this increase in industrial production therefore masks such deficiencies in the economy that were not combatted in the post-war period, making the extent of modernisation in industry limited, although the rate of recovery means it cannot be claimed that there was no modernisation at all.

                While modernisation may have been taking place in industry, the same cannot be said for agriculture. There was a continuation of the Stalinist treatment of agriculture from the 1930s when it was treated merely as a source of revenue, and there was no attempt to modernise agriculture in order to increase grain production. Rather, grain procurement increased to 60-70% of the harvest, but actual harvest figures failed to reach pre-war levels until much later. It was only in 1952 that the harvest figure totalled that of 1913, which was still low. Although it cannot be disputed that there was recovery after the war as grain harvests returned to pre-war levels, this recovery was achieved through “insufficient investment” and “ill-judged intentions” as historian Nove notes, thereby it was not modernised, and recovery was still limited. So long as there was enough grain to export and feed the workforce in order to sustain industrial recovery, Stalin had no intention of modernising an economic sector he deemed to be nothing more than revenue.

                Following Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev enacted his policy of destalinisation which historian Thatcher cites as, “the removal of Stalinist excesses”, thereby already establishing that Khrushchev had no intention of completely removing Stalinism, the economic aspects of which were central-planning and neglect of agriculture and consumer industries, but rather to streamline the existing system to adapt to the shifting economic landscape. One of his main policies under destalinisation was his notorious Virgin Lands Scheme, when in the summer of 1954, over 250,000 volunteers, mainly from the Komsomol, were sent to regions in Kazakhstan and western Siberia to cultivate the virgin soil for grain production. In its nature, the Virgin Lands Scheme can be viewed as an attempt at modernisation in focusing on improving grain production as opposed to grain procurement. It achieved initial success, with grain production increasing by 50% and totalling 50% of the total grain harvest of the USSR, showing an extent of modernisation in this aspect of the economy, but this success was not sustained. In 1963, despite the target for grain production being 180 million tonnes, only 107 was harvested. By the end of the scheme, 13,000 m² of topsoil had been eroded due to over-cultivating the land, and when Khrushchev instructed the farmers to plant maize, only 1/6 could be harvested due to the rest having rotted. The Virgin Lands Scheme became one of Khrushchev’s “hare-brained schemes” that were used for his dismissal, and its failure comes down to the traditional weaknesses of the Soviet economy, poor planning and obsolescence, as there was a lack of fertilisers, machinery and expertise being directed towards the scheme, replaced by an over-reliance on labour. While Khrushchev made more attempt to modernise agriculture than Stalin had by focusing on production rather than procurement, like Stalin, he failed to plan coherently and give it the length of consideration it needed.

                As Nove notes, “Economically speaking, the Brezhnev period has to be seen as a disaster”, already giving the inclination that there was limited modernisation during the Brezhnev regime.

Historiography cites the Brezhnev period as an “Era of Conservatism”, conservatism meaning that it stuck to tradition and suspected reform, once again embedding the idea that there was little to no modernisation being attempted. When it was attempted, mainly in space and defence technology as shown by the 15-year scientific research programme the regime approved of, these were the same priorities as under Stalin and Khrushchev, rather than adjusting to new conditions such as the modernisation of civilian sectors. Rather, such sectors were treated with suspicion, including typewriters, personal computers and photocopiers. The fear of losing control over distribution of information stifled modernisation of consumer industries. While Laver does cite there to have been “no evidence of widespread dissatisfaction” as living standards generally improved, with a 50% increase in consumption of meat, vegetables and fish, this was not because of attempts to modernise the economy. This was the growth of a vast “2^nd economy”, estimated to have amounted to 100 billion roubles annually, filling in the gaps of consumer industries the regime failed to have accounted for. Therefore, even if living standards had generally improved compared to Khrushchev and Stalin, this was not due to modernisation, but because the black market supported the economy where it fell short.

                But even within prioritised economic sectors like heavy industry there was also limited modernisation. Reform was suspected and obstructed by the bureaucrats who maintained their positions through Brezhnev’s Stability of Cadres, causing Brezhnev to reverse Khrushchev’s policy of decentralisation and his determination to make central-planning work. This was exemplified by the Kosygin Reforms, which were introduced in 1965 to encourage managers to be more accountable for prices, costs and encouraged profit-motive, so that heavy industries like coal would no longer be operating at a loss. These reforms were unsuccessful due to a variety of factors, namely that there were clashes between managers eager to comply with these reforms and the conservative bureaucrats in charge of ensuring targets were met, or because there were managers unenthusiastic about innovation due to lack of incentives and the fear of not meeting centrally-determined targets. In either case, these issues arose from the dead weight of the command economy that remained, leading to the deficiencies of low productivity from the Stalin era. The reforms were abandoned by 1970 as the economy continued to stagnate, with the Russian economist Khanin estimating economic growth between 1975-80 to have only been 1%. When reform was attempted, it was killed off at an early stage before it could materialise, or modernisation was hardly attempted at all. Therefore, unlike with Stalin and Khrushchev, in terms of heavy industry, unsuccessful modernisation was not caused by deficiencies in the reform being attempted, it was because this reform was hardly being attempted in the first place.

                Therefore, while agriculture continued to be a sector in which hardly any modernisation was attempted, or was attempted and wholly didn’t succeed, heavy industry was a mixed bag. While under Stalin heavy industry saw impressive recovery because of successful modernisation, this success was not continued to the same extent by Khrushchev or Brezhnev as the economy slipped into stagnation, and  any attempts at modernisation following Stalin was undermined by his centrally-commanded economy that did not adapt to the shifting modern and innovative economic landscape.