This is an essay I wrote answering the following question, and it received band 4/5, which is the equivalent of an A*.
“The USSR
had failed to recover from the impact of the Great Patriotic War by the time of
Stalin’s death in 1953.”
Assess the validity of this view
Following the Great Patriotic
War, despite their victory the USSR was suffering from the destruction the war
had left in its wake. It is estimated by modern historians that an excess of 20
million troops were killed during the war, leaving a gap in the workforce that
would need to recover the production line, despite 2/3 of Soviet industrial
property also being destroyed. In the post-war environment, Stalin was quick to
return to his hard-line politics, calling upon the people to help rebuild the
world power status of the USSR with their iron will, though great hardship
followed. The period of 1945-53 was coined as “High-Stalinism”, where his
hard-line politics allowed the USSR to achieve great recovery economically and
industrially.
However, in other areas, most notably agriculture, recovery was either limited
or non-existent, where the climate was similar to that of the USSR during the
1930s. Therefore one would be more inclined to align themselves with the
interpretation that while the USSR may have succeeded in
recovering economically, this has its own limitations, while other social and
political aspects are viewed as a failure to recover.
Through Stalin’s 4th Five Year
Plan the USSR succeeded in recovering their heavy industry, which the war had
had a great impact on. For the duration of the German occupation, industrial
infrastructure had been damaged by the bombing of Blitzkrieg tactics, while the
USSR itself used “scorched earth” policy to avoid the German invasion using
Soviet resources. The material damage can be expressed in terms of the loss of
output and income, that loss of income 7 years’ worth of pre-war levels.
However, due to the target-driven nature of the 4th Five Year Plan,
most targets in heavy industries such as coal, iron, oil, electricity, etc.
were met or exceeded. By 1950, industrial production had increased by 75%
compared to the figures of 1940. There were also great gains made in rebuilding
damaged infrastructure, including the Soviet railway and Dnepropatrovsk dam.
But this wasn’t just through the 4th Five Year Plan. After the war,
the USSR was able to strip assets from its newly acquired territory, including
East Germany, and these assets were also used to help recover industry. Although it may be claimed that Soviet figures of industrial recovery may be
exaggerated to an extent, it must be acknowledged that the trend of progression and increased
output shown in these figures is likely to be realistic. From the evidence
discussed, one cannot conclude that the USSR had completely failed to recover, as heavy industry can be viewed as an
economic success in terms of recovery.
However, there were limitations
to recover within this area of industry. Due to the quantity over quality
nature of the target-driven Five Year Plans, much of the Soviet industry
remained inefficient and labour intensive, leading to low productivity levels
due to obsolete machinery and the mass casualties of skilled workers. In light
of this comment, the Stalinist model led to many serious hardships faced by the
workers who were expected to achieve targets despite the lack of manpower. As a
result of the Five Year Plans encompassing government priorities, many consider
there to be a negation in recovery as consumer industries were completely
neglected as a fundamental component to the economy. This led to shortages of
basic necessities, including clothes, which drove people towards Black Markets
where they would play “unofficial” prices for goods. Many suggest this led to a
loss of wealth, suggesting that there were limitations to economic recovery.
One may refute this point, as statistics indicate the GDP of 1948 exceeded that
of 1938, which may be viewed as indication of recovery. Yet, when considering
the fact that the post-war period was known as the “Golden Age” where many
countries experienced economic recovery, one may be more inclined to argue that
when compared to the recovery of countries such as France, the gains made by
the USSR are less impressive. Linked to international affairs, the economic
recovery of the USSR was limited in that after the war the USSR lost the
economic aid provided by her previous allies: the UK and the USA. The USA
lend-lease programme had accounted for 23% of aid received by the USSR during
the war. Therefore, there was economic recovery within heavy industry, consumer
industries suffered as a result of neglect due to priorities being focused on
the former. And even while being prioritised, there were limitations to the
extent heavy industries recovered, due to the inefficiency of the Stalinist
model under which heavy industry was governed. Therefore one may conclude that
heavy industry overall was neither a total success, nor a total failure in
terms of recovery.
On the other hand, one area of
economy that may be viewed as a total failure in terms of recovery, was
agriculture. Like in the 1930s, farming was viewed by the government as a
source of revenue gained from exporting grain, and by feeding the industrial
workforce, even if the farmers themselves went hungry. And this turned out to
be the case, after 1945 the state took 60-70% of harvested grain, despite
actual grain production depleting. The 1946 grain harvest was 1/3 of that of
1940, and the actual 1940 figure remained unreached until 1952. This prompted a
famine that lasted between 1946 and 1947, echoing the famine from the 1930s.
Stalin’s successor Khrushchev painted a bleak picture of the state of rural
USSR by claiming there were reports of cannibalism started as a result of
starvation during the famine, which certainly suggests attempts of recovery in
agriculture, such as reducing the bureaucracy in rural areas, or creating
brigades in 1950, totally failed. But, it is disputable as to whether the war
had an actual impact on the state of agriculture. The state of agriculture post-war was only a
continuation of the failure of agriculture during the 1930s, and that this
economic area never recovered before the war. Therefore it would be incorrect
to assume that agriculture is an example of failing to recover from the war, as
it was always failing to recover even before the war.
From a political perspective,
many Western historians agree that rather than there being recovery in this aspect,
there was only a regression, both on a domestic and global scale. From her
participation in the war, the USSR had gained alliance with Britain and, though
not to as much an extent, the USA. However, by 1953 these alliances had been
completely cut off as a Cold War climate of tensions and a Nuclear Arms Race
ensued. Though it could be considered a political success that the USSR was
considered competition to other Western superpowers in terms of its military
and weaponry, as well as extending its control to the Eastern European
satellite states, this wasn’t without creating its own enemies. In terms of
domestic politics, Stalin by 1953 had secured his position as he maintained
“High Stalinism”, which some Soviet historians claim is an example of recovery
as by securing the regime’s position, Stalin had secured political security and
stability within the USSR. Others, like intentionalist historians refute this
claim, comparing Stalin’s “totalitarian” state to that of the Tsarist regime. Stalin
had managed to centralise his government, while making sure that officials
remained inferior to him as the “god-like” figurehead from his cult of
personality. The sense of political terror and militarism of the 1930s was
echoed by The Leningrad Affair and Doctor’s Plot, the former involving the
imprisonment and possibly even torture of 200 Leningrad party officials,
leaving no room for input under Stalin’s rule. However, it is debatable as to
whether the war had an impact on Stalin’s political position in the first
place. Though generals like Zhukov were allowed to make great contributions to
the war effort, Stalin remained the figurehead and High Commander of his
centralised military organisation the Stavkha, and therefore arguably the war
had no impact on his position in the first place.
In terms of social recovery, one
must focus on Zhdanov’s cultural reforms that were implemented into Soviet
society following the war. Due to the high death toll, many women found it
harder to marry, resulting in a rise of inter-ethnic marriages, which were
clearly in contradiction with Stalin’s aim of “russification”. Furthermore,
following the war Stalin became more paranoid of Western influences seeping
into Soviet culture and tainting the Russian “identity”. Leningrad became
viewed as a “window of the West”, which may have been a motivation for the
Leningrad purge mentioned before. In order to correct this social impact, Stalin
turned to Zhdanov and his cultural reforms, which became known as Zhdanovism.
He introduced a policy of “anti-Cosmopolitanism”, banning any Western
influences including jazz, as well as encouraging a surge in “Russian
Nationalism”. While the population were certainly influence by these reforms,
this was accompanied by a rise in Antisemitism and the feeling of alienation
by the other nationalities. This could potentially viewed as a reason for the
collapse of the USSR later down the line, but at that point also weakened the
USSR’s social unity. Furthermore, it discouraged people being able to think for
themselves, and hindered Soviet technological and scientific advancements as
they were prohibited from collaborating with Western science communities. Therefore,
though Stalin achieved his aims of ridding the USSR of Western influence, this
was to be a hindrance to the USSR’s own advancements, which can be viewed as a
failure in social recovery.
In conclusion, although from an economic perspective the USSR recovered
their loss of heavy industry production, this had its own limitations, while
other areas of the economy like agriculture failed to recover. Politically,
domestic politics consisted of a secured regime which brought both stability,
but terror, though the war may not have affected this to begin with. Through
the social reforms of Zhdanov, Russia managed to retain its own national
identity, but the nationalities surrounding Russia became alienated, and so the
unity of the republics became fragile, which, when considering it synoptically,
could have been a reason for the eventual collapse of the USSR. Therefore, in
some respects the USSR managed to recover, but in other areas completely failed
to do so, leading to the conclusion that the USSR partially failed to recover
from the impact of the war.
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