“Stalin’s leadership was the most significant reason for Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War.”

This question was written in exam conditions and received 42/45, which is band 5 and an A*! I’ll be uploading a mind map for this question in my essay plan section. Stalin looks likely to be a question on the exam this year so here’s hoping it’s similar to this one.

“Stalin’s leadership was the most significant reason for Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War.”

Assess the validity of this view.

                The Great Patriotic War lasted between the USSR and Germany between 1941-45, following the German invasion known as Operation Barbarossa on June 22^nd 1941. By this time, Stalin had placed himself in command of a centralised leadership and economy, having total control of the USSR. His leadership must therefore be considered a major factor in the Soviet victory. As Pearson notes, “Stalin played a pivotal role in every aspect of the war effort.” However, unlike the centralised Soviet system, the responsibility for Soviet victory cannot be placed on Stalin as a sole individual, there were external factors such as German errors, the success of the Russian economy and the notorious 1941 winter that accumulated towards victory, not to mention the role of Stalin being downplayed by his own flaws as a leader. Therefore, Stalin’s leadership was not the most significant reason for Soviet victory.

                Stalin had many successes as a wartime leader, and it must be acknowledged that he held some responsibility for victory. He had propaganda value as a figurehead, and was willing to divert focus from Communist sentiments towards patriotism in enlisting soldiers through propaganda campaigns. The war became a fight for “Mother Russia”, a fight for the nation as opposed to the regime, which yielded great success. Within a fortnight of the invasion, 10 million soldiers were enlisted into the Red Army. Stalin’s willingness to shift focus from Communism to patriotism encouraged the iron will of the people to sustain the many hits of the Germans, and so the success of propaganda must be considered as a successful aspect of Stalin’s leadership. Furthermore, Stalin enacted a reversal on religious oppression in his conscious decision to have a revival of the Russian Orthodox Church, which as part of Stalin’s propaganda campaign portrayed the way as a Holy War. By the end of 1943, there were over 15,000 functioning orthodox churches in the USSR, encouraging millions of previously persecuted Christians to contributed to the war effort, adding to the numbers of the military and Soviet population that dwarfed Germany’s, thereby enabling them to sustain losses. The Church also encouraged allies to open up a 2^nd Front, forcing Hitler to scatter his already weakened military further across Europe, weakening the German army to Soviet counter-attacks. These examples of Stalin’s cunningness demonstrate significant contributions he made to the war effort.

                But, as historian Pearson also acknowledges, Stalin made “fatal errors” at the beginning of the war, most notably not allowing “his troops to mobilise in time”. He relied too much on the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, deluding himself that Hitler wouldn’t invade, as well as signing a 1940 trade pact that gave Hitler the necessary resources to strengthen his army. Stalin ignored 80 warnings that Hitler intended to invade; rather than mobilising his army in preparation, he had the German informant shot. This meant when the invasion arrives, the USSR was not in the military capacity to fight the Germans off. Within hours of Operation Barbarossa, Blitzkrieg tactics had shot down 1200 Soviet aircraft, and the Germans were advancing 50 miles a day. Following the invasion, Stalin had fled Moscow without a centralised military command, preventing effective decision-making, and his pre-war purges of over 22,000 officers caused troop shortages, leading to initial defeats. This suggests his leadership was detrimental to the war effort, therefore it was not a significant factor. However, Stalin was able to learn and make up for his mistakes in recognising his incapacity in the military, devolving decision-making down to his trusted generals like General Zhukov, as opposed to political commissars, so they could actually make effective contributions to the war effort. His centralised military command could bypass bureaucracy and address immediate military concerns. Therefore, while Stalin did make mistakes to being with, in the later years of the war he lead effectively, but it was due to other factors that he was given the chance to lead the Soviets to victory.

                Based on the early years of the war, German victory seemed inevitable. However, German error obstructed this victory, and allowed the Soviets to counterattack. While Stalin lead a centralised economy directed towards the war effort, Hitler chose not to unilaterally do so, and deprived the army of supplies. 250,000 German soldiers died of frostbite in the harsh winter of 1941, opening the chance for a Soviet counterattack. While it seems Stalin cunningly seized on this moment, this would not have occurred had Hitler organised his economy towards the war. Another gross error of Hitler was failing to utilise the support of the nationalities. During the invasion, the German army was welcomed as the Soviet people’s liberators in many provinces, especially the Ukraine, who had become disillusioned by Stalin’s harsh collectivisation drive in the 1930s. It is estimated that as many as one million Soviets defected to fight with the Germans. Were it not for the Germans’ barbaric treatment of 6 million prisoners of war, this figure may have been greater. It provoked pro-Soviet sentiment and gave rise to the anti-German propaganda of Stalin, assisting him in encouraging ordinary citizens to fight with the Red Army in any way they could, defending major cities in digging trenches, seen in the Battle of Moscow as 250,000 women dug trenches. But Hitler’s fatal flaw was to invade the USSR to begin with, opening the Second World War to a second front that Germany in both its economic and military capacity couldn’t sustain. Stalin cunningly seized on this fact by turning the Great Patriotic War into a “war of attrition”. Quantitatively, the Soviet Army dwarfed Germany’s and 25 million Soviet troops died in the war which totalled 30% of Germany’s 1940 population, but less than 15% of the USSR’s. Hitler underestimated the length of the war, and was therefore unprepared to sustain gradual losses while Stalin consciously knew the USSR could. But ultimately, it was Hitler’s own errors that allowed Stalin’s counterattack, and had Hitler not made mistakes, the war would have been won by the Germans sooner, while Stalin was having to come to terms with his own flaws. Stalin’s leadership can therefore not be considered the most significant reason for victory.

                The Allied efforts also had a part to play in the war, although they were not the most significant. By opening up additional fronts in Italy and France, they forced Hitler to divert troops from Stalingrad and Kursk, weakening the numbers of his army in the USSR, and allowing Stalin the chance to counterattack. Foreign aid also assisted the USSR. The Lend-Lease scheme in 1942 totalled $111 billion in aid, and accounted for an estimated 1/5 of Soviet resources. It filled the gaps left in the economy, covering the blind spots that the Germans could have outnumbered the USSR in. While Stalin’s leadership may have played a role in this factor, in that he established these foreign relations in the first place, it was also his failure to provide for soldiers through consumer industry production, as well as in transport, where the USSR only built 52 trains as opposed to the 1000 provided by the USA, that meant foreign aid was required to begin with. Although foreign aid was not the significant factor for victory, it highlighted Stalin’s deficiency that prevents him from also being a significant factor.

                Historian Harrison states “If WWII was a test then the Soviet economy passed it.” Overy correlates the war effort’s failure in 1941-2 to economic failure, and victory to economic success. The economy played a pivotal role in Soviet victory. Industry was mobilised further away as resources could be effectively prioritised, provided by direct order under centralised system. 3500 new factories were built, while 2593 were rebuilt in the Urals away from German occupation. This meant that despite German occupation of the USSR, including 1/3 of its industrial base, the USSR could continue to produce the necessary materials for the war effort. This economic success certainly ties back to Stalin’s 1930s policies of his 3^rd Five Year Plan and industrialisation, as well as establishing a centralised economic system that bypassed bureaucracy in the war. But the economy was supported by the iron will of the Soviets, whom, despite being encouraged to work by propaganda, continued to sustain the war of attrition based on its sheer quantity and patriotism, which Stalin capitalised on, but didn’t have total responsibility for.